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A (THIGH) GAP IN THE LAW: ADDRESSING 
EGREGIOUS DIGITAL MANIPULATION OF 
CELEBRITY IMAGES 
Jessica L. Williams-Vickery* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, world-renowned supermodel Coco Rocha agreed to be 
photographed for the cover of one of Elle’s magazine publications, 
Elle Brazil.1 Rocha posed for the pictures in a dress with significant 
cutouts, covered only by a sheer layer of skin-toned fabric.2 In 
keeping with her firm policy of no full or partial nudity, Rocha wore 
a bodysuit underneath the dress to limit her exposure.3 When Elle 
published the magazine, the final product shocked Rocha; the 
magazine had altered the image to remove her bodysuit, giving the 
impression Rocha had shown more skin than she in fact had.4 Rocha 
took to her personal blog to express her frustration and 
disappointment at Elle’s disrespectful editing.5 Unfortunately, this 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Associate Professor 
Yaniv Heled and Professor Michael B. Landau for your patient, invaluable guidance in the development 
of this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of the Georgia State University Law Review for their 
tireless work on this Note and in general; my friends and family for being my encouragement and source 
of strength; and—most of all—my husband, Grant, whose love and support are my reliable constants in 
this ever-changing, unpredictable life. 
1.Coco Rocha Could Sue Elle Brazil for Not Honoring Her No-Nudity Policy, POPSUGAR (Apr. 24, 
2012), http://www.popsugar.com/fashion/Coco-Rocha-Could-Sue-Elle-Brazil-Nude-May-2012-Cover-
22813916 [https://perma.cc/7H76-HLBN]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; Jenna Sauers, Top Model Coco Rocha Slams Mag for Photoshopping Off Her Underwear, 
JEZEBEL (Apr. 25, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/5905088/top-model-coco-rocha-slams-mag-for-
photoshopping-off-her-clothes (noting that given Rocha’s “firm policy against doing nude work, implied 
nude work, or anything that might be read as too sexualized for her tastes . . . it’s very strange that Coco 
Rocha should appear looking practically topless on the May cover of Brazilian Elle magazine”) 
[https://perma.cc/CV2J-FULH]. 
 5. Coco Rocha, Elle Brazil Cover–May 2012, OH SO COCO: A BLOG BY COCO ROCHA (Apr. 20, 
2012), http://oh-so-coco.tumblr.com/post/21728809733/elle-brazil-cover-may-2012 
[https://perma.cc/2T2N-VZE2]. In this blog post, Coco Rocha explains her longstanding policy of no 
nudity or partial nudity in photoshoots. Id. She mentions that although she wore a bodysuit under her 
dress in the Elle photoshoot, the image was edited to make it appear as though she was “showing much 
more skin than [she] actually was or [was] comfortable with.” Id. Rocha further states, “I strongly 
believe every model has a right to set rules for how she is portrayed and for me these rules were clearly 
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problem is not limited to Rocha—she is only one of many models 
and celebrities who have expressed frustration about excessive image 
manipulation.6 
The right to privacy and right of publicity protect individuals’ 
abilities to control when their identities are promulgated and when 
                                                                                                                 
circumvented.” Id. Although Rocha claimed she contractually prohibited this type of image 
manipulation by Elle, the exact language of the agreement was not revealed. See Coco Rocha Could Sue 
Elle Brazil for Not Honoring Her No-Nudity Policy, supra note 1. This Note focuses on whether, even 
absent prohibitory contractual language, a celebrity or model in a situation like Rocha’s could sue for 
egregious image manipulation. 
 6. See Cindi Leive, Crystal Renn on Her Skinny Photos: “I Don’t Look Like That,” GLAMOUR 
(July 15, 2010, 6:08 AM), http://www.glamour.com/story/on-the-cl-crystal-renn-on-her 
[https://perma.cc/6C9U-KS36]; Amy Odell, Crystal Renn Says She Was Photoshopped Thinner in Her 
Fashion for Passion T-Shirt Shoot, N.Y. MAG. (July 15, 2010, 5:20 PM), 
http://nymag.com/thecut/2010/07/crystal_renn_says_she_was_phot.html [https://perma.cc/CMB7-
ZUXR]. Model Crystal Renn, who struggled for years with anorexia before returning to health and 
becoming a plus-size model, did a photoshoot for a charitable campaign, Fashion for Passion, with the 
campaign’s founder and photographer, Nicholas Routzen. Levie, supra. When the finished photographs 
were published, Renn’s fans were concerned by Renn’s portrayed thinness. Id. Given her publicized 
eating disorder battle, the media and fans wondered whether Renn had experienced an anorexia relapse. 
Id. In actuality, Routzen had manipulated the images significantly, making Renn appear much thinner 
than she was in reality. See id. Of the photos, Renn said, 
I was shocked. When I saw the pictures, I think I was silent for a good five 
minutes, staring with my mouth open. I don’t know what was done to the 
photos or who did it, but they look retouched to me. And listen, everybody 
retouches, but don’t make me into something I’m not. . . . Having had an 
eating disorder, I know what that very thin body looks like on me, and it’s 
not something I find attractive. It’s not something I aspire to. I feel 
completely confident in my own health because I know I don’t look like 
that, but even to see it in an image was really disturbing to me. . . . People 
who have followed my story and heard my voice might think I’ve turned 
my back on that. 
Id. See also Tricia Gilbride, 8 Celebrities Who Spoke Out Against Photoshop in 2015, MASHABLE (Dec. 
18, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/12/18/celebrities-reject-photoshop-2015/#SHIon2IBagqR 
[https://perma.cc/GM5Y-K8PZ]; Peggy Truong, Kerry Washington Doesn’t Recognize Herself on the 
Cover of Adweek, COSMOPOLITAN (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/ 
celebs/news/a56370/kerry-washington-photoshop-adweek-magazine-cover [https://perma.cc/4UEA-
9EEU] (explaining Washington’s frustration concerning the final product of her Adweek magazine 
cover, which she said had been so altered that she “felt weary” and strange because the image was so far 
from what she sees when she looks in the mirror); Celebrity Photoshop Fails: Kate Winslet, E! ONLINE, 
http://www.eonline.com/photos/12299/celebrity-photoshop-fails/377403 (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/T7E3-AZNH] (explaining Kate Winslet’s frustration with her final 2003 GQ magazine 
cover, which Winslet said “reduced the size of [her] legs by about a third”). Model Zendaya complained 
on Instagram of a photo of her in which her hips and torso were substantially altered, arguing altered 
photos are what create and perpetuate unhealthy beauty ideals; she released the original photograph, 
saying, “Anyone who knows who I am knows I stand for honest and pure self love.” Gilbride, supra. 
Regarding digitally manipulated images of herself, Demi Lovato shared she often gets frustrated 
because, without her consent, people alter her photograph to the point that she feels it no longer 
represents her body. Id. 
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their identities are commercially used, respectively.7 But these rights 
only protect people’s decisions regarding when their image is shared 
by requiring permission; if permission has been granted, the right to 
privacy and right of publicity do not address individuals’ rights to 
control how their image is subsequently portrayed.8 
This Note identifies gaps in current relevant law and the resulting 
need to recognize individuals’ right to control not just when their 
image is used commercially or otherwise, but how it is used. Part I 
introduces the right to privacy and the right of publicity, and explains 
the current state of the law in those areas as it applies to digitally-
manipulated celebrity images.9 Part II then offers a critical analysis 
of current law and evaluates whether it effectively allows individuals 
to control how their identity is used.10 Finally, Part III proposes 
solutions to the law’s shortcomings in an attempt to better protect 
individuals’ right to determine how their identity is publicly 
represented.11 
I.   Background 
The vast majority of images published in magazines and 
advertisements are digitally manipulated.12 Today, the practice of 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Andrew Berger, “Hey, That Publication Is Using a Photo of Me”: The Right of Publicity 
Explained, COPYRIGHT NEWS YOU CAN USE (Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & Hirschtritt LLP, New 
York, N.Y.), June 2005, at 1, 3. 
 8. Compare Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding no valid claim for 
violation of right to privacy where the plaintiff clearly gave the defendant consent to make any desired 
changes to the disputed image), with Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 
1985) (finding defendant liable for violations of plaintiff’s right to privacy and right of publicity where 
the defendant disseminated nude photographs of the plaintiff without authorization). 
 9. See discussion infra Part I. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
 12. See Career Confidential: The Photo Retoucher Who Usually Doesn’t Have to Distort Bodies, 
BUZZFEED (July 20, 2012, 10:24 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/buzzfeedshift/career-confidential-the-
photo-retoucher-who-usual?utm_term=.rjdNXNvZGv#.xmRknkpv9p [https://perma.cc/WF66-L2EH] 
(interviewing a professional retoucher, who stated that because of the number of advertisements both in 
and outside of magazines, there are probably more images retouched for advertisements than for 
magazines); Hayley Phelan, Anonymous Retoucher Says ‘100 Percent’ of Fashion Images Have Been 
Altered, Calls Beauty Ads the ‘Biggest Lie of All,’ FASHIONISTA (July 20, 2012), 
http://fashionista.com/2012/07/anonymous-retoucher-says-100-percent-of-fashion-images-have-been-
altered-calls-beauty-ads-the-biggest-lie-of-all [https://perma.cc/5S2D-N8X8] (quoting a career retoucher 
who said that every image published in the fashion or beauty industry has been retouched); Dylan 
3
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image editing is not just commonplace—it is expected in professional 
publications.13 When people permit their photograph to appear in a 
publication or advertisement, they typically consent to the publisher’s 
use of their image through a model release.14 Model releases are 
“liability waiver[s] or exculpatory agreement[s] typically signed by 
the subject of a photograph granting permission to publish or sell the 
photograph in one form or another,”15 and they often contain 
provisions that allow the publishing entity to alter the licensed 
photograph as it sees fit.16 
Two legal principles are particularly relevant to the use and 
modification of a celebrity’s image: the right of publicity and the 
right to privacy.17 The right of publicity, which developed out of the 
right to privacy, protects the property interest in the commercial 
value of one’s identity.18 The right to privacy, in contrast, provides 
individuals with control over disbursement and distribution of 
information about themselves.19 Although there are differences 
                                                                                                                 
Stableford, Photoshopping Mag Covers: How Much Is Too Much?, FOLIO MAG. (Oct. 4, 2007), 
http://www.foliomag.com/photoshopping-mag-covers-how-much-too-much/ [https://perma.cc/J6LF-
LZJ4] (stating photo manipulation in magazines has become so common that some publications have a 
“retouching” budget). 
 13. See generally Phelan, supra note 12; Career Confidential: The Photo Retoucher Who Usually 
Doesn’t Have to Distort Bodies, supra note 12. 
 14. DAN HELLER, A DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHER’S GUIDE TO MODEL RELEASES: MAKING THE BEST 
BUSINESS DECISIONS WITH YOUR PHOTOS OF PEOPLE, PLACES, AND THINGS 41 (Robyn B. Siesky et al. 
eds., 2008) (stating that model releases are “almost always used in the context of a photograph”). 
 15. Tharpe v. Lawidjaja, 8 F. Supp. 3d 743, 779 (W.D. Va. 2014). 
 16. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (referencing a broad release 
signed by the plaintiff that allowed the defendant to use the image at issue “for all purposes, to the sale, 
reproduction and/or use in any manner of any and all photographs”); Krupnik v. NBC Universal, Inc., 
No. 103249, 2010 WL 9013658, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2010) (referencing model agreement that 
granted the licensee the right to “use, reuse, publish, modify, or license” video, photographs, and audio 
recordings taken by the licensee of the plaintiff “in any way whatsoever”). 
 17. Although use and modification of celebrity images potentially implicate other areas of the law—
such as defamation, misappropriation, etc.—the right to privacy and right of publicity are arguably best 
suited for analysis of egregious image manipulation because, together, they remedy the harm suffered in 
such instances. Thus, the applicability of other areas of law are outside the scope of this Note. 
 18. Right of Publicity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the right of publicity as 
“[t]he right to control the use of one’s own name, picture, or likeness and to prevent another from using 
it for commercial benefit without one’s consent”). 
 19. Right of Privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the right of privacy as 
“[t]he right of a person . . . to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny or exposure”); see also Invasion 
of Privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the invasion of one’s right to privacy 
as “[a]n unjustified exploitation of one’s personality or intrusion into one’s personal activities, 
actionable under tort law”). 
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between these two rights, they overlap to such a degree that 
distinguishing them can be difficult, and attempts to label claims as 
one or the other sometimes causes confusion.20 This difficulty has 
also extended to determining who may bring a claim based on these 
rights. Specifically, courts struggled to identify who holds the right to 
privacy and right of publicity.21 For example, courts previously 
doubted whether celebrities may claim a violation of their right to 
privacy because they arguably forfeited their right to privacy in 
exchange for fame and money.22 However, the law now recognizes 
that celebrities’ fame does not undo their susceptibility to “emotional 
distress or humiliation from an unauthorized exploitation of their 
name or likeness.”23 Because the right to privacy exists to rectify this 
type of harm, and celebrities are—despite their fame—susceptible to 
it, celebrities do have a right to privacy.24 The legal community also 
wrestled with whether the right of publicity belongs only to public 
figures or whether it extends to private persons.25 Although 
celebrities may more frequently invoke the right of publicity, current 
law states that “the identity of even an unknown person may possess 
commercial value.”26 Accordingly, in most jurisdictions, private 
persons may bring a claim for violation of their right of publicity if 
an appropriation of their identity diminishes its value.27 Thus, despite 
prior confusion surrounding who holds these rights, celebrities and 
private individuals alike generally hold both the right of publicity and 
the right to privacy.28 
A.   Right to Privacy: False Light Invasion of Privacy 
In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court decided the “leading case” 
nationally in favor of the right to privacy. Between then and 1960, 
                                                                                                                 
 20. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed. 2016). 
 21. Id. § 4:10. 
 22. See id. 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 24. Id. 
 25. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 4:15. 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 27. See id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 4:16. 
 28. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, §§ 4:9, 4:10, 4:14. 
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many jurisdictions accepted the right to privacy, but there was little 
consistency regarding its scope and application.29 William Prosser 
attempted to clarify the law by suggesting four distinct categories of 
the right to privacy, one being “false light” invasion of privacy.30 
This cause of action allows recourse for individuals when 
objectionable publicity falsely attributes to them “characteristics, 
conduct, or beliefs” that resultantly invade their privacy.31 To 
successfully bring a claim for false light invasion of privacy, a 
plaintiff must prove each of the following four elements: (1) the 
defendant’s representation regarding the plaintiff was, in fact, false; 
(2) a reasonable person would find the representation highly 
offensive; (3) where the plaintiff is a “public figure,” as is generally 
the case with celebrities, that the defendant had knowledge of the 
representation’s falsity or recklessly disregarded whether it was 
truthful; and (4) the false representation was publicized.32 Even if a 
plaintiff successfully proves all elements and has suffered damage, 
the defendant may assert one of several available defenses in an 
attempt to evade liability.33 If a plaintiff succeeds, however, the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. §§ 1:17, 1:18. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), the 
Georgia Supreme Court recognized the existence of an individual’s right to privacy as necessary in light 
of natural law and prior court decisions. Id. Following this decision, courts slowly began to accept the 
right to privacy. However, as William Prosser noted, by 1960, “[i]n nearly every jurisdiction the first 
decisions were understandably preoccupied with the question whether the right of privacy existed at all, 
and gave little or no consideration to what it would amount to if it did.” William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383, 388 (1960). 
 30. Prosser, supra note 29, at 389 (breaking the right to privacy into four distinct categories: (1) 
“[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs”; (2) “[p]ublic disclosure 
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; (3) “[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye”; and (4) “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name 
or likeness”) (emphasis added). 
 31. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 1:22 (explaining that an action for the false light invasion of 
privacy, although similar to a claim for defamation, is distinguishable because it protects “injury to 
human dignity” that results when a person is given “unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that 
attributes to him characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false,” whereas defamation focuses on the 
injury to a person’s reputation). 
 32. 33 RICHARD E. KAYE, CAUSES OF ACTION: CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF 
PRIVACY § 4 (2d ed. 2016); MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 5:112. 
 33. See KAYE, supra note 32, § 9 (listing the following as potential defenses to a claim for false light 
invasion of privacy: unpublicized representation; representation not highly offensive to a reasonable 
person; representation was truthful; defendant did not know the representation was false and did not act 
with reckless disregard to its truthfulness; representation was privileged; and plaintiff consented to the 
representation). 
6
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damages awarded are intended to remedy reputational harm and 
mental or emotional hardship resulting from the false 
representation.34 
B.   Right of Publicity 
Whereas false light invasion of privacy offers recourse for damage 
to an individual’s reputation or mental and emotional harm, the right 
of publicity permits compensation for the commercial value of the 
plaintiff’s identity to the degree it was used without consent.35 
Beyond monetary damages, a violation of the right of publicity often 
results in an injunction barring the defendant’s further unauthorized 
commercial use of the plaintiff’s persona.36 Although the right of 
publicity extends to all individuals, celebrities most often invoke its 
protection.37 To obtain monetary or injunctive relief, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant’s conduct constituted “knowing use, without 
consent, of another’s name, photograph or likeness for the purposes 
of advertising or solicitation of purchases.”38 As with false light 
invasion of privacy, a defendant accused of violating an individual’s 
right of publicity may assert a defense to avoid liability.39 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See id. § 19 (explaining a plaintiff may recover in an action for false light invasion of privacy for 
harm to the individual’s “privacy interest,” for “mental and emotional distress,” for “special damages,” 
and for “punitive damages”); MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 5:114 (“[D]amage is usually measured by 
mental distress and perhaps injury to reputation.”). 
 35. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 11:30 (explaining that the damage to the plaintiff’s “proprietary 
property right” is a key distinguishing characteristic of the right of publicity, and in measuring the 
damage to that property right, “the plaintiff’s commercial injury guides). 
 36. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 11:22; 31 THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION: 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY § 38 (2d ed. 2016). 
 37. A Brief History of the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/brief-
history-of-rop [https://perma.cc/HM8C-MWTL] (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).  
 38. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 39. See BOGGESS, supra note 36, § 14 (listing the potential defenses a defendant may bring against a 
plaintiff in a right of publicity suit as (1) refuting an element of the right of publicity claim, (2) raising 
an issue regarding the statute of limitations, (3) arguing federal law preemption of the plaintiff’s asserted 
right, and (4) asserting the defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech protects the 
defendant from any potential liability). For egregious image manipulation, showing the plaintiff 
consented to the use at issue is one of the most relevant defenses. 
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C.   Applicable Precedent 
Although the above-stated principles of law include relatively clear 
elements, their application nonetheless proves difficult. This is 
particularly true given that the right of publicity and right to privacy 
are state-defined causes of action and as such vary—typically in 
minor ways—from state to state.40 Within the context of digital 
manipulation, courts generally hold that consent to image 
manipulation and publication via a model release bars the subject 
from bringing a claim against the publishing entity for a violation of 
the right to privacy or right of publicity.41 
 However, this publisher protection only extends to the degree of 
consent granted in the model release—any use beyond the scope 
authorized could result in liability for breach of the model release and 
violations of the right to privacy and right of publicity.42 Further, a 
defendant may be held liable where the model release language is 
ambiguous and extrinsic evidence successfully proves the defendant 
violated the parties’ intended image use boundaries.43 Conversely, if 
a model release unambiguously permits the defendant’s allegedly 
improper image manipulation and use, extrinsic evidence attempting 
to prove a contrary meaning is impermissible; the clear meaning of 
the model release controls, and the defendant is not liable.44 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 6. Although some states have chosen to enact 
statutes addressing the right of publicity, other states decide right of publicity cases based on common 
law and judicial precedent. Id. § 6:2. For states with a statutory right of publicity, significant variation 
exists between the statutory language and scope. Id. § 6:5. For example, some of the right of publicity 
statutes extend to cover protection of the commercial use of a deceased person’s persona, whereas other 
states limit the protection to living persons. Id. 
 41. See Krupnik v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 103249, 2010 WL 9013658, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 
29, 2010) (concluding no liability where the defendant altered and used the plaintiff’s photo within the 
terms of the signed model release, in which the plaintiff granted consent for use); Spiegel v. Schulmann, 
604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding no violation of the plaintiff’s rights of publicity or right to 
privacy where the plaintiff’s image was altered beyond what he anticipated for a weight-loss 
advertisement because the agreement plaintiff had signed specifically allowed for the defendant to make 
any desired changes to the image). 
 42. Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1983) (“[A] defendant’s immunity from a claim for 
invasion of privacy is no broader than the consent executed to him.”); see Douglass v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding defendant Playboy magazine, acted 
outside the scope of its model release with the plaintiff in selling the plaintiff’s nude images to 
defendant Hustler magazine for publication). 
 43. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 10:24. 
 44. Id. 
8
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Although courts most often find defendants liable only where their 
use exceeds the scope of the model release, some courts have held 
defendants responsible where their use fell within the limitations of 
the agreement but “the licensee ma[de] a significant change in the 
substance of the particular use which [was] licensed.”45 In applying 
this “substantial modification” principle, the Russell v. Marboro 
Books court said of the image manipulation at issue, “[I]f the picture 
were altered sufficiently in situation, emphasis, background or 
context, I should think that it would no longer be the same portrait, 
but a different one.”46 Because the Russell defendant altered the 
photo so extensively, the court considered it a different image 
altogether from the one for which the plaintiff granted consent, and 
the model release thus failed to shield the defendant from liability.47 
As the Russell decision demonstrates, courts pay particular attention 
to the degree of the plaintiff’s consent in evaluating whether a 
defendant’s use violates the individual’s rights to privacy, publicity, 
or both. 
II.   Analysis 
Current interpretation of relevant law and policy effectively denies 
celebrities the power to control their images following consent to 
publication.48 Because no express legal recognition of egregious 
image manipulation exists, determining the availability of a remedy 
for celebrities in such situations requires a close analysis of existing 
law and public policy. The rights of publicity and privacy, together 
with relevant precedent, provide a framework by which to determine 
celebrities’ rights in instances of egregious image manipulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. § 10:37. 
 46. Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
 47. Id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 10:37 (indicating there are some circumstances in which the 
defendant may so manipulate an image that the use no longer falls within the scope of the model release 
between the parties). 
 48. See, e.g., Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 461 F. Supp. 2d 174, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding consent barred a right of publicity claim where plaintiff signed a contract with a magazine 
permitting the defendant to use his “name, likeness and biographical material in connection with the 
publication of any Photographs produced”); Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2000) (“Complete defenses exist where (1) the statement is true, or (2) the plaintiff consented to 
the publication.”). 
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Specifically, these causes of action provide insight into whether 
celebrities have recourse when their images are so extensively 
manipulated that they feel the image no longer represents them or 
blatantly contradicts the public persona they have created. 
A.   Do Model Releases Allow Recourse in Instances of Excessive 
Digital Image Manipulation? 
Model releases, signed by celebrities consenting to the publication 
of their images, often contain clauses granting the publishing entity 
power to manipulate the images prior to publication.49 In bringing a 
claim for violation of the right to privacy or infringement of the right 
of publicity, consent is a critical question.50 Subsequently, a model 
release granting digital manipulation rights presents one of the most 
significant obstacles to a celebrity’s ability to recover for egregious 
image manipulation.51 
Consent is a central issue in actions for infringement of the right of 
publicity or right to privacy.52 If a defendant can prove that the 
plaintiff validly consented to the contested use of the plaintiff’s 
image, then the plaintiff cannot successfully sue for violation of 
either right.53 Thus, the existence of a signed model release granting 
the defendant the unqualified right to alter and manipulate the images 
at issue threatens the success of the celebrity’s cause of action.54 This 
formulaic approach to model releases stems from a fundamental 
principle of contract law: respecting the right of private parties to 
contract as they choose.55 For this reason, courts hesitate to look 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Krupnik v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 103249, 2010 WL 9013658, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 
29, 2010) (analyzing model release granting defendant right to “use, reuse, publish, modify, or license” 
images of plaintiff); Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (evaluating model release granting 
“unrestricted use” of images of the plaintiff-model). 
 50. See BOGGESS, supra note 36, § 17; KAYE, supra note 32, § 15. 
 51. See Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 18–19. 
 52. See BOGGESS, supra note 36, § 17; KAYE, supra note 32, § 15. 
 53. See BOGGESS, supra note 36, § 17; KAYE, supra note 32, § 15. 
 54. See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 461 F. Supp. 2d 174, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Spiegel 
v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 55. See Nancy Hylden, Contracts—A Rose by Any Other Name: No Tolling of an Arbitration 
Agreement Limitation Period, but Unreasonableness Achieves the Same End in Rose Revocable Trust v. 
Eppich, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 635, 646 (2002) (referencing the “highly regarded private right to 
freely contract”). 
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outside the terms of the release where they are clear and unequivocal, 
despite a plaintiff’s understandable objection to how the defendant 
used or altered the image.56 Such objections are perceived as an issue 
of hindsight.57 Where the defendant’s conduct technically complies 
with the terms of the model release, courts find the plaintiff made the 
personal decision to allow alteration and use of the image at the 
defendant’s discretion.58 
Despite this hurdle, precedent reveals a potential method for 
circumventing the terms of a model release.59 Where contract 
provisions authorizing image manipulation existed, at least one court 
nonetheless found the defendant liable for the use of egregiously 
manipulated images.60 The New York Supreme Court cleared the 
model release hurdle by emphasizing the degree and manner in which 
the defendant altered the image in question.61 The court found that, 
given the substantial degree of image manipulation involved, the 
manipulated image constituted a new image altogether—an image for 
which the plaintiff had not granted consent.62 This exception to the 
model release bar on recovery perfectly suits instances of egregious 
manipulation of celebrity images. Where a defendant–publisher edits 
an image so extensively that it taints the celebrity–subject’s 
reputation or makes the celebrity look like a different person 
altogether, the image is arguably a new image—one for which the 
publisher must new consent for its use. 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See, e.g., Krupnik v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 103249, 2010 WL 9013658, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
June 29, 2010). 
 57. Morgan v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 711, 718 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, who published the plaintiff’s picture in a pornographic publication 
without the plaintiff’s prior knowledge, where the terms of the model release were “clear and 
unambiguous” and thus could not be overcome by the plaintiff’s “[t]wenty-twenty hindsight”). 
 58. See, e.g., id. 
 59. See Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27–28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (finding the 
defendant’s use outside the scope of the consent granted by the plaintiff); Sauers, supra note 4 
(suggesting unequal bargaining power between models and publishing entities, stating, “[T]he fact that a 
major magazine would ignore even Coco’s efforts to have some control over her own image gives a 
sense of how little authority models really have”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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Beyond exceeding the scope of the model release, other 
considerations suggest a need to look beyond model releases.63 Those 
who purport strict adherence to clear model release provisions 
suggest celebrities take preventative measures to avoid manipulation 
of their image.64 Specifically, they advise more thorough model 
release negotiations to give celebrities and models increased power in 
determining how and to what extent their image may be altered.65 
Those involved in the modeling and fashion industry, however, claim 
the context of model agreements complicates negotiations.66 In the 
fashion industry in particular, businesses and publishing entities may 
have unequal bargaining power compared to those whose images 
they seek to use.67 Models are often replaceable; if one does not 
agree to a model release granting permission to edit the images, 
another will.68 Subsequently, success in the industry hinges on one’s 
willingness to submit to publisher-friendly model release 
provisions.69 Because egregious image manipulation may fall outside 
the scope of even an expansive model release, however, and because 
unequal bargaining power exists in the relevant industries, the hurdle 
of model release consent is potentially overcome. 
B.   Do the Rights of Publicity and Privacy Currently Support a 
Remedy? 
Even if able to clear the hurdle of consent, recourse for egregious 
digital image manipulation does not fit perfectly within an existing 
cause of action. First, neither the right of publicity nor the right to 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Sauers, supra note 4 (suggesting unequal bargaining power between models and publishing 
companies and that models who object to the way they are represented may face scrutiny and the 
possibility of being blacklisted in the industry). 
 64. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 10:24. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Sauers, supra note 4. 
 67. Coco Rocha Could Sue Elle Brazil for Not Honoring Her No-Nudity Policy, supra note 1. 
Advocates within the industry suggest the unequal bargaining power that exists is partially due to the 
“systemic disempowerment in the industry” of models and subjects of photographs. Sauers, supra note 
4. To be successful, it is often necessary for celebrities and models to comply with the terms put forth by 
the publishing entity or risk being replaced by someone willing to do so. Id. 
 68. See Coco Rocha Could Sue Elle Brazil for Not Honoring Her No-Nudity Policy, supra note 1. 
 69. See Sauers, supra note 4. 
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privacy wholly remedies the scope of damage suffered.70 Whenever a 
celebrity’s image is liberally altered, the injury may be to both the 
personal right to privacy and the property right of publicity—
impacting not only the celebrity’s reputation but the monetary value 
of the celebrity’s persona as well. Thus, neither cause of action alone 
is sufficient to remedy the harm. Further, neither cause of action’s 
elements alone, as currently interpreted, provide a well-fitted solution 
to the problem of excessive image manipulation.71 
1.   False Light Invasion of the Right to Privacy 
Although some elements of false light invasion of privacy easily 
fit instances of excessive image manipulation, others are more 
difficult to apply. The elements requiring that the representation be 
false and given publicity are satisfied in these instances; celebrities’ 
frustration with heavily-edited photographs stems from the publicly-
made, false representations of the celebrities’ appearances in the 
photographs.72 Although the degree of falsity involved in instances of 
image manipulation varies, generally, a claim requires only that the 
plaintiff show that the publicity at issue “[has] the capacity to give 
rise to a false public impression.”73 For some celebrities, this was the 
primary concern regarding a manipulated image—that the image 
would cause the public to believe they were different than they really 
were, whether it be thinner, more scantily clad, etc.74 
However, these two elements of falsity and publicity are not the 
only requirements in a false light invasion of privacy claim.75 
Another element, requiring that a reasonable person would find the 
false representation highly offensive, is more difficult to satisfy in the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 71. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 72. See, e.g., Truong, supra note 6; Gilbride, supra note 6. 
 73. Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy—Cognizability and 
Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22 § 12 (1987). 
 74. See Odell, supra note 6 (explaining model Crystal Renn’s frustration that her edited image made 
her appear drastically thinner to the public); Rocha, supra note 5 (explaining Rocha’s frustration that her 
edited image made her appear scantily clad before the public, in contradiction of her policy). 
 75. KAYE, supra note 32, § 4. The right to privacy requires two other elements, including (1) that the 
falsity be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and, particularly in instances involving public figures, 
(2) that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the representation at issue. Id. 
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context of image manipulation. This difficulty arises out of case law, 
which indicates that a plaintiff’s subjective outrage at the false 
representation fails to meet the reasonable person requirement.76 
However, the Restatement of Torts indicates the plaintiff’s 
circumstances and position ought to be taken into account in 
determining whether the false representation was offensive enough to 
constitute a false light invasion of privacy.77 Depending on the 
degree to which a court considers a plaintiff’s circumstances in 
determining the offensiveness of the false representation, a situation 
like that of Coca Rocha’s—in which the publishing magazine edited 
her image to remove her bodysuit despite her policy of showing 
minimal skin—may be sufficiently offensive.78 
The final element of a false light invasion of privacy claim 
requires defendants to have knowingly or recklessly disregarded the 
falsity of their representation regarding the plaintiff.79 Proving this 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. To satisfy the element of offensiveness, the false representation must be so offensive as to 
offend a reasonable person. Id.; Godbehere v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 786 (Ariz. 1989) 
(explaining that “trivial indignities” are insufficient, and a plaintiff’s “subjective threshold of sensibility 
is not the measure” for determining whether a representation is highly offensive, but that, instead, the 
measure is what would be highly offensive to a reasonable person). Although the reasonableness 
standard does indicate objectivity, many courts introduce a subjective element as well. See, e.g., Uhl v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1979). 
 77. Donaldson, supra note 73, § 35; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 
1977) (“It is only when there is such a major misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or 
beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable man in his position, 
that there is a cause of action for invasion of privacy.”) (emphasis added). Case law supports this 
proposition, as well, indicating the importance of considering the plaintiff’s subjective circumstances in 
determining whether the offensiveness reaches the degree required by the element. See Welling v. 
Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (Ohio 2007) (“Recognizing ‘highly offensive’ information, even 
framed within the context of what a reasonable person would find highly offensive, necessarily involves 
a subjective component.”). 
 78.  Coco Rocha Could Sue Elle Brazil for Not Honoring Her No-Nudity Policy, supra note 1. Even 
if editing Rocha’s image to remove the body suit beneath her dress would not have been sufficiently 
offensive to an average person, when considered in light of her known policy of showing minimal skin, 
such conduct by the publishing entity may be enough to meet the threshold of offensiveness required by 
the element. See Uhl, 476 F. Supp. at 1139. The Uhl court found the highly offensive element met 
because the representation of the plaintiff–hunter as having shot walking—as opposed to flying—geese 
was “a rather nasty thing to say about a hunter” in the geographic area. Id. This case illustrates the 
impact of considering subjective characteristics of the plaintiff—here, the plaintiff’s status as a hunter 
and the geographic area—in determining whether a representation qualifies as highly offensive. Id. 
Rather than evaluate the element of offensiveness to a reasonable person from a purely objective 
standpoint, the Uhl court understood it to necessarily require a consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding the false representation. Id. 
 79. KAYE, supra note 32, § 7. 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss3/6
2018] EGREGIOUS DIGITAL MANIPULATION 809 
presents an interesting tension. On one hand, when a defendant edits 
an image, the purpose of the edits is to create an image that is false to 
some degree—that is, not true to the reality of the original 
photograph or subject.80 Conversely, to say defendants knowingly or 
recklessly made a false representation regarding a plaintiff simply 
because they altered an image, even to a slight degree, would sweep 
broadly to characterize the defendants’ conduct—widely accepted in 
the media and fashion industry—as potentially liability-inducing.81 
Given this tension, instances of image manipulation fail to 
categorically fit one way or the other within this element. 
Subsequently, although false light invasion of privacy offers a 
potentially viable remedy for celebrities suffering harm due to 
egregious image manipulation, the fit is an imperfect one. 
2.   Right of Publicity 
One of the prominent requirements for a violation of the right of 
publicity is a showing that the defendant did not have consent to use 
the plaintiff’s name, photograph, or likeness.82 The consent issue 
presents a substantial challenge to the availability of a remedy in the 
context of image manipulation; but, as previously discussed, this 
obstacle may be overcome by the combination of precedent 
recognizing egregious changes to an image as outside the scope of 
the consent granted and by recognition of the unequal bargaining 
power prominent in the industry.83 Beyond the obstacle of consent, 
use of an egregiously-manipulated image arguably fits well within 
the remaining elements of the right of publicity because the 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Deception and Disguise, PHOTOSHOP IN THE MEDIA (May 3, 2011), 
https://sabrinahicks.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/deception-and-disguise/ [https://perma.cc/NK5Z-
UVPN]. 
 81. See Photoshopping: Altering Images and Our Minds, BEAUTY REDEFINED (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.beautyredefined.net/photoshopping-altering-images-and-our-minds/ [https://perma.cc/N38J-
MDL5] (quoting an editor at Self magazine who responded to criticism for extreme manipulation of the 
magazine’s cover images, saying, “Yes, of course we do post-production corrections on our images. 
Photoshopping is an industry standard.”). 
 82. BOGGESS, supra note 36, § 12. 
 83. See Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27–28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Sauers, supra note 
4. 
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defendant in these instances knowingly used the celebrity’s 
photograph for commercial gain. 
Even if a claim for egregious image manipulation fits within the 
right of publicity, the remedies provided for violations of the right 
match only a portion of the harm suffered.84 First, an injunction, 
though commonly issued in right of publicity cases and sufficient to 
prevent the defendant from further unpermitted use of the celebrity’s 
image, would do nothing to compensate for the harm already 
suffered.85 A celebrity could, under the right of publicity, be 
compensated for the “market value of nonpermitted use” given the 
public value of a celebrity’s image, but this would only address the 
financial harm suffered by the celebrity.86 The right of publicity does 
not provide recourse for emotional or reputational harm, and 
resultantly fails to provide a remedy matching the injury.87 Thus, 
although a claim for infringement of the right of publicity may 
address a portion of a celebrity’s damaged interests, it is an imperfect 
solution on its own. 
C.   Is Recognizing a Right in the Interest of Public Policy? 
In addition to recourse for egregious digital manipulation nearly 
fitting within existing causes of action, public policy further reveals 
the need to recognize celebrities’ right to a legal remedy in these 
situations. If recognized, this right would allow celebrities more 
control over what their image is used to impliedly endorse—an 
interest courts have protected. In the Ninth Circuit case Waits v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., the plaintiff–singer, Tom Waits, brought a claim 
against Frito-Lay for an advertisement which used the voice of his 
sound-a-like, giving the impression he had participated in the 
advertisement himself.88 Waits, however, had previously publicly 
denounced artists’ participation in commercials.89 The court found 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See BOGGESS, supra note 36, §§ 37 to 38. 
 85. Id. § 38. 
 86. Id. § 40. 
 87. Id. § 39. 
 88. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 89. Id. at 1097. 
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Waits was entitled to recovery because, given his “outspoken public 
stance” against commercial endorsements, the advertisement made 
him an “apparent hypocrite.”90 This is the same concern often 
expressed by celebrities regarding altered images.91 For example, for 
a celebrity who publicly promoted positive body image in an attempt 
to combat eating disorders, subsequent manipulation of her image to 
make her appear significantly thinner than in reality would make her 
a hypocrite before the public.92 Recognizing celebrities’ right to 
control how, and for what purpose, their image is used may thus help 
prevent this type of issue. 
III.   Proposal 
The problem of egregious celebrity image manipulation requires a 
response. Recognizing that the areas of law most implicated in this 
issue—contract law, the right to privacy, and the right of publicity—
are traditionally state-determined, the response ought to be state-
driven as well.93 To efficiently address the problem of egregious 
manipulation of celebrity images, states should provide recourse 
either by expanding judicial interpretation of existing law or enacting 
new legislation. 
A.   Remedying the Harm of Egregious Image Manipulation 
In states that already recognize the right of publicity and false light 
invasion of privacy, courts should expand their interpretation of the 
common law or statutory causes of action.94 States that do not 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 1103. 
 91. See Leive, supra note 6 (quoting actress Crystal Renn, “People who have followed my story and 
heard my voice might think I’ve turned my back on [being a healthy weight], and that it’s only beautiful 
to be thin.”); Odell, supra note 6. 
 92. See Leive, supra note 6. Model Crystal Renn had reentered the modeling world as a plus-size 
model following a public eating disorder battle and had taken a public stance against the thinness 
promoted in the modeling industry and media. Id. However, despite her known stance, a business she 
agreed to do a photoshoot with edited her image to make her appear very thin. Id. She subsequently 
expressed concern that people would think she had not been genuine in her prior denunciations of the 
unhealthy ideal advanced by the American media. Id. 
 93. Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell, No. CV 16-13-ART, 2016 WL 4470746, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
19, 2016); MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 6:1. 
 94. Some states recognize these causes of action in common law, while others have enacted statutes 
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recognize the right of publicity or false light invasion of privacy 
should either recognize these causes of action—and view them as 
permitting recovery for egregious image manipulation—or enact 
legislation specifically creating recourse in such situations.95 
1.   Expanding Preexisting Law 
States that recognize both the right of publicity and false light 
invasion of privacy should expand these doctrines to cover the harm 
resulting from extreme image alteration. Courts could easily 
accomplish this expansion themselves. Specifically, courts should 
expand the common law or statutory judicial interpretation so the 
scope of existing causes of action allows recovery in these instances. 
As previously noted, the harm caused by image manipulation very 
nearly fits the harms protected by the right of publicity and false light 
invasion of privacy.96 Courts could not adequately provide a remedy 
by either cause of action alone because each protects a different 
interest affected by egregious digital image manipulation.97 Thus, by 
expanding the interpretation of a limited number of elements within 
these causes of action, courts could fit a remedy within preexisting 
law. Specifically, courts must expand their approach to the elements 
addressing consent, offensiveness, and the defendant’s known or 
reckless false representation. This solution remedies the current lack 
of recourse while simultaneously avoiding the challenge of passing 
new legislation. 
Successful expansion of these causes of action requires several 
changes to judicial interpretation. First, courts must be willing to look 
                                                                                                                 
creating the causes of action. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 6:1. Some of the states that recognize these 
rights by statute include California, Indiana, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Id. §§ 6:10, 6:55, 6:58, 6:64. 
Other states have chosen to recognize these rights under common law, which provides greater flexibility 
for courts in determining claims. Id. § 6:1. A few of the states that recognize the rights of publicity and 
privacy under common law include Arizona, Illinois, and Ohio. See id. §§ 6:2, 6:3. 
 95. For example, many states have yet to recognize the right of publicity. MCCARTHY, supra note 
20, § 6:1. Some states recognize one of the relevant causes of action but do not recognize both. Id. 
 96. See discussion supra Part II. 
 97. Compare Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that the right of publicity protects “the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities”), 
with MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 11:27 (explaining that false light invasion of privacy protects 
individuals from indignity and reputational harm). 
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beyond the existence of model release agreements to determine 
whether the celebrity gave valid consent. Rather than end the consent 
inquiry at the existence of a broadly-drafted model release, courts 
should conduct a fact-based analysis to determine whether the 
publishing entity’s image manipulation and publication exceeded the 
intended scope of the agreement.98 Following the example of the 
court in Russell, courts should ask whether the edits made were so 
extensive or out-of-character as to have created a new image 
altogether—one for which the celebrity did not give consent.99 Not 
only does this broader consent consideration recognize the danger of 
finding absolute consent, it also provides leeway for celebrities and 
models in light of the unequal bargaining power that exists in the 
industry.100 
 Beyond consent, recourse for image manipulation also requires 
courts to more broadly interpret two elements specific to false light 
invasion of privacy claims: that the false representation be (1) 
offensive to a reasonable person and (2) made recklessly or 
knowingly by the defendant.101 Courts should allow celebrity–
plaintiffs to meet these requirements by showing that the highly 
edited image directly contradicts their public reputation or publicly-
held beliefs.102 Courts ought to determine whether image 
manipulation meets the reasonable offensiveness threshold by 
evaluating the offensiveness not purely objectively, but in light of the 
“subjective component” of the plaintiff’s circumstances, as many 
courts already do.103 In the context of digital image manipulation, a 
claim would then meet this standard if a celebrity showed that the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See generally Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
 99. Id. at 27. 
 100. Sauers, supra note 4. 
 101. KAYE, supra note 32, § 4. 
 102. This public, apparent contradiction is precisely what models Coco Rocha and Crystal Renn 
complained of regarding their published, edited images. See Odell, supra note 6; Rocha, supra note 5. 
Coca Rocha expressed frustration that the image of her on the cover of Elle Brazil contradicted her 
known policy of showing minimal skin. Rocha, supra note 5. Similarly, Crystal Renn was frustrated 
because the edited image of her, making her appear extremely thin, gave the public the impression that 
she was disingenuous in her public eating disorder battle and recovery. Odell, supra note 6. 
 103. See, e.g., Uhl v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1979) 
(considering the plaintiff’s status as a hunter and the geographic location in making offensiveness 
determination). 
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image, as edited, would offend a person in their shoes. For example, 
consider a situation in which a celebrity publicly supports People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and criticizes animal-
derived clothing, only to subsequently have her image edited to make 
it appear as though she wore a minx fur coat in a photoshoot. In that 
context, the image manipulation would likely be considered offensive 
to a reasonable person because the altered image makes the celebrity 
appear self-contradicting. Courts should further interpret this 
showing of apparent contradiction to also satisfy the requirement that 
the defendant recklessly or knowingly made a false representation. If 
the highly-edited image contradicts the celebrity’s public reputation 
or stance, the publishing entity—privy to the same information as the 
public—likely knew and disregarded, or was at least “reckless[ly] 
indifferen[t]” to, the image’s misrepresentative nature.104 
By implementing a more inclusive interpretation of the 
aforementioned elements, courts would allow celebrity–plaintiffs 
recourse for egregious image manipulation but only in a limited set 
of circumstances. This broadened interpretation would not make 
courts susceptible to a flood of litigation; rather, it would limit 
recovery for image manipulation to those instances in which the 
publishing entity’s extensive edits made the celebrity–plaintiff an 
“apparent hypocrite.”105 
2.   Enacting New Legislation 
States that do not recognize the requisite causes of action, or 
whose statutory schemes are too narrowly written to allow expanded 
judicial interpretation, should enact new legislation providing 
recourse for egregious image manipulation. Like states expanding 
preexisting doctrine, new legislation ought to be narrowly-focused 
and provide recourse in limited situations. New legislation should 
provide a remedy where the celebrity–plaintiff shows that the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. KAYE, supra note 32, § 7. For a cause of action to stand under false light invasion of privacy, the 
plaintiff must show actual malice on behalf of the defendant. Id. This standard is satisfied for public 
figures by showing the defendant made the false representation either knowingly or recklessly. Id. 
 105. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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manipulated image was (1) outside the scope of any consent granted, 
(2) would be offensive to a reasonable person in the celebrity’s 
circumstances, and (3) directly conflicts with the celebrity’s public 
reputation or known stance on an issue.106 
3.   Matching the Remedy to the Harm 
As previously discussed, celebrities facing egregious image 
manipulation suffer at least two types of harm: (1) harm to the 
pecuniary value of their public image and (2) reputational, mental, 
and emotional harm from the misrepresentation. Celebrities bringing 
a claim for egregious image manipulation—whether under an 
expanded interpretation of the right of publicity and false light 
invasion of privacy or under a new piece of legislation—should have 
access to damages for both types of harm. 
For celebrities bringing a claim under expanded existing law, the 
usual remedies for the rights of publicity and privacy together 
perfectly redress the harm suffered by the celebrity. Further, the 
remedy due for egregious image manipulation is consistent with the 
type of harm the right of publicity and false light invasion of privacy 
were created to protect.107 The right of publicity remedy would 
compensate the celebrity–plaintiffs for damage to the commercial 
value of their identity.108 The supplemental false light invasion of 
privacy remedy would compensate celebrity–plaintiffs for the 
noncommercial harm to their psyche and reputation as a result of 
being made an “apparent hypocrite” before the public.109 Lastly, the 
equitable remedy of an injunction must be available to keep the 
defendant from further perpetuating the damaging image.110 This 
                                                                                                                 
 106. These requirements closely correspond with the elements of a claim for false light invasion of 
privacy and violation of the right of publicity under expanded judicial interpretation of common law or 
statute. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 107. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, §§ 1:7, 11:27. 
 108. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 109. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103; see KAYE, supra note 32, at § 19. 
 110. Prohibitory Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining this most common 
form of injunction as “[an] injunction that forbids or restrains an act”); Conrad v. Kaup, 291 N.W. 687, 
688 (Neb. 1940) (explaining the purpose of an injunction “is not to afford a remedy for what is past, but 
to prevent future mischief, not being used for the purpose of punishment or to compel person to do right, 
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would not expand the remedies already available under the right of 
publicity and false light invasion of privacy; courts have often 
granted injunctions in conjunction with these causes of action to 
prevent further damage to the plaintiff.111 
Celebrities suing under new legislation ought to have access to the 
same scope of recourse. Thus, newly-enacted legislation addressing 
image manipulation should contemplate damages for commercial and 
noncommercial damage, as well as the availability of injunctions. 
Beyond addressing the harm suffered by the celebrity, public 
policy further supports allowing recourse in these instances because 
doing so may help remedy the harm of negative body image that so 
pervades U.S. culture.112 Many celebrities today voice their 
opposition to the unhealthy body ideals purported in the media.113 
Allowing these celebrities recourse when their image has been edited 
to look unrealistically thin has two benefits: it provides them the 
opportunity to positively impact body ideals in the media, and it 
punishes defendant–publishers whose excessive image manipulation 
contributes to the negative body image epidemic. 
                                                                                                                 
but merely to prevent them from doing wrong”). 
 111. See generally, e.g., Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428, 432 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1920) (granting an injunction in an invasion of privacy claim to prevent defendant from continuing 
to use the plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 731 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting a preliminary injunction and scheduling a hearing for a permanent injunction 
based on a violation of right of publicity claim, recognizing an injunction as the most appropriate 
remedy for stopping the defendant’s violation of the plaintiff’s right). 
 112. See Kelly Wallace, Kids as Young as Five Concerned About Body Image, CNN (Feb. 13, 2015, 
11:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/living/feat-body-image-kids-younger-ages/ 
[https://perma.cc/8VZE-2U5S] (revealing new research that indicates up to “half of girls and one-third 
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Influences, JUST SAY YES, https://www.justsayyes.org/topics/self-image-media-influences/ 
[https://perma.cc/365A-FKCM] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (citing many studies that reflect the 
prevalence of negative body image in the U.S. and its connectedness to the media, including one in 
which “69% of girls in 5th–12th grades reported that magazine pictures influenced their idea of a perfect 
body shape”); What Are Eating Disorders?, NAT’L EATING DISORDERS ASS’N, 
https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/learn/general-information/what-are-eating-disorders (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/FM6G-8NT6] (explaining that an estimated “20 million women 
and 10 million men in America will have an eating disorder at some point in their lives”). 
 113. See Claire Schmidt, Jennifer Lawrence to Lena Dunham: Fifteen Inspiring Celebrity Quotes 
About Body Image, TODAY (May 3, 2014, 6:51 PM), http://www.today.com/style/jennifer-lawrence-
lena-dunham-15-inspiring-celebrity-quotes-about-body-2D79604323 [https://perma.cc/Y42D-PPV3]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Digital image manipulation is pervasive, and the current state of 
the law fails to provide recourse for celebrities who suffer egregious 
manipulation of their images at the hands of publishing entities.114 As 
matters stand, courts will generally end any inquiry into potential 
violations of the rights of privacy or publicity if an expansive model 
release agreement exists.115 Consent to image alteration effectively 
bars recovery, no matter how extensive or offensive the 
manipulation.116 Subsequently, celebrities are left with no legal 
recourse for the harm they suffer. 
States should allow celebrities a legal remedy in instances of 
egregious image manipulation if the altered image directly 
contradicts the celebrity’s public reputation or convictions. First, 
courts should deem some image manipulation so egregious as to fall 
outside the scope of even an expansive model release agreement.117 If 
courts take this stance, then the doctrines of right of publicity and 
false light invasion of privacy can provide a remedy that matches the 
harm suffered. States that recognize these doctrines should expand 
their scope to allow recovery. Further, states that do not recognize 
either the right of publicity or false light invasion of privacy should 
enact legislation to do so. These laws ought to permit damages for 
both commercial and noncommercial harm, as well as injunctive 
relief for ongoing conduct. By requiring celebrities to show the 
manipulated image directly contradicts their public reputation, states 
would provide due recourse for egregious manipulation without 
exposing courts to voluminous or burdensome litigation. 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Phelan, supra note 12; Stableford, supra note 12. 
 115. See, e.g., Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 461 F. Supp. 2d 174, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010); Krupnik v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 103249, 
2010 WL 9013658, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 116. See Krupnik, 2010 WL 9013658 at *2, *8 (holding no liability for the defendant where the image 
was made part of a movie scene in which one of the characters impliedly masturbates while looking at 
the plaintiff’s image). 
 117. See Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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